India's Energy Storage Scheme

 

India's Energy Storage Scheme: The Cabinet Moves — But Are We Ready?

A follow-up to years of writing on battery storage as India's renewable bottleneck

The Union Cabinet has approved a comprehensive energy storage scheme, as reported by Ashwini Vaishnaw this week. Moneycontrol - Union Cabinet Approves Energy Storage Scheme

For anyone who has tracked India's renewable ambitions — as I have for nearly a decade — this is both encouraging and incomplete. Let me explain why.

The Familiar Problem: We've Been Here Before

I've argued repeatedly that storage is not optional in India's energy transition; it is foundational. Back in 2018, I noted that despite India's 300 days of annual sunshine and the desert regions' staggering potential to generate 315.7 GW of solar power, the bottleneck was clear: "But how to 'Store' all that huge amount of Solar generated electricity and use it round the clock when Sun is not shining?" Blog - "National Energy Storage Mission" - February 19, 2018

That question has haunted every energy policy discussion since. A decade ago, Elon Musk installed a 100 MW / 129 MWh lithium-ion battery facility in Australia for $50 million in just 100 days, and Australia's blackouts stopped. India, by contrast, could have generated 315.7 GW from its deserts alone but couldn't store it.

The Cabinet approval is a signal that someone finally recognizes storage as what it is: a strategic, not peripheral, piece of India's energy architecture.

What Changed? And What Hasn't

The 2023 SECI tender for a first-of-its-kind standalone battery power bank envisaged Rs 2,000 crore for 1,000 MWh of storage capacity in Rajasthan. The government set a target of 4,000 MWh as part of the plan to increase renewable energy penetration in the grid — with the Central Electricity Authority projecting a need for 27,000 MW (or 108,000 MWh) of storage capacity by 2029-30. Email - "Grid Storage Battery: 4 Years – and Counting!" - October 25, 2023

Now, with Cabinet approval, those targets have moved from debate to policy.

But here is what still needs to be solved:

1. Lithium costs remain a barrier. The 2023 tender noted that a 500% spike in lithium prices made batteries expensive, pushing battery power tariffs beyond viability for entities leasing capacity. Two years later, this same friction likely persists. We cannot build a 500 GW renewable India on viability gap funding alone.

2. Financing structures must be standardized. In my 2025 blog on rebidding languishing solar and wind projects bundled with BESS, I emphasized that success requires: "Separate but linked price discovery for energy and storage or a transparent hybrid tariff model" and "Risk allocation that attracts long-term capital (who shoulders degradation risk, FCAS obligations, etc.)." Blog - "Rebidding Languishing Solar and Wind Projects: Why Bundling Storage Is More Than a Fix — It's a Strategy" - September 21, 2025

A Cabinet approval without clear power purchase agreements and financing standards will stall projects in the same way earlier schemes have.

3. Domestic supply chain capacity. BESS safety, raw material sourcing, and recycling remain underdeveloped in India. Tesla's recent push into India's energy storage market signals that global players are ready — but India must simultaneously build local capability or risk perpetual dependence. As I noted in my Tesla piece from April 2026: "India will need locally competitive manufacturing or compelling incentives to lower end-user prices." Blog - "Tesla's India Energy Play" - April 8, 2026

Why This Cabinet Move Matters (and What It Must Do Next)

The Cabinet approval recognizes what I have repeatedly written: that India cannot achieve 500 GW of renewable energy by 2030 without firm power. Intermittent solar and wind, without storage, will hit grid constraints far before reaching 500 GW. Storage is not a luxury feature — it is the enabling infrastructure.

But approval is not execution.

The scheme will succeed only if policy now addresses three immediate gaps:

Gap 1: Cost reduction through aggregation and competition. Don't let BESS become another high-cost infrastructure category where one-off tenders inflate prices. Instead, aggregate demand across utilities, states, and industry to create volumes that bring per-MW costs down. I've proposed this before: "Governments and large corporates should pool demand (aggregated tenders) to create predictable volumes and lower unit costs." Blog - "Tesla's India Energy Play" - April 8, 2026

Gap 2: Regulatory integration. Storage must be integrated into India's ancillary services markets and compensatory mechanisms. A battery sitting on the grid should earn revenue for frequency regulation, peak shaving, and capacity services — not just energy arbitrage. Without these signals, asset utilization remains suboptimal.

Gap 3: Domestic industrial strategy. Offer time-bound incentives for domestic cell and pack manufacturing, and simultaneously build a roadmap for battery recycling and second-life use. India cannot depend on imports forever; the goal should be to build an export-grade BESS supply chain.

A Pattern Worth Noting

India has announced renewable energy schemes before. The targets climb each year — 40 GW of rooftop solar by 2022, then 500 GW by 2030. Yet execution often lags because the supporting infrastructure — transmission, storage, financing — develops in a staggered, reactive way.

This energy storage scheme has the chance to break that pattern, but only if the Cabinet approval is treated as the beginning of a structural overhaul, not the end of a policy announcement.

In my 2025 blog on rebidding, I argued: "If we treat this as a one-time procurement exercise, we will only unearth the same structural frictions. If instead we use these rebids as pilots to create standardized, bankable frameworks and build domestic supply chains, we will have taken an important stride toward a resilient, modern grid." Blog - "Rebidding Languishing Solar and Wind Projects" - September 21, 2025

The same logic applies here.

What I Would Like to See Now

1. A detailed tender roadmap with timelines, risk allocation frameworks, and standardized PPA templates.
2. Explicit financing support — viability gap funding, concessional rate credits, or government-backed guarantees — for early-stage projects to de-risk lenders.
3. A domestic manufacturing push: incentives for cell assembly, pack integration, and recycling.
4. Integration with the 500 GW renewable target: clarity on how much BESS is needed to achieve that capacity without curtailment and without dependence on fossil peaker plants.

The Longer Arc

Ten years ago, I wrote that India's deserts could power the nation round-the-clock if we solved the storage puzzle. Today, with Cabinet approval of an energy storage scheme, that puzzle is officially recognized as unsolvable through battery imports and one-off projects alone.

That recognition is progress.

But approval is not ambition met. The real test comes now — in how quickly and thoughtfully this scheme translates into standardized, bankable, domestically-led project pipelines that lower costs, build skills, and secure India's energy independence.

I remain optimistic that the team will get there. But they must move past announcement and into the hard work of structural, integrated planning.

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Sources

#	Title	Date	About
1	National Energy Storage Mission	2018-02-19	India's desert solar potential and the battery storage bottleneck for round-the-clock power.
2	Grid Storage Battery: 4 Years – and Counting!	2023-10-25	First-of-its-kind SECI renewable battery power bank tender and lithium price inflation challenges.
3	Rebidding Languishing Solar and Wind Projects: Why Bundling Storage Is More Than a Fix — It's a Strategy	2025-09-21	Structural reforms needed for hybrid solar-wind-storage auctions and standardized contracting.
4	Tesla's India Energy Play	2026-04-08	Tesla's entry into India's energy storage market and the need for domestic BESS supply chains.

 

Service Liability in Action : 

The Mumbai Commissioner and the Encroachment Case

When a Supreme Court Justice Becomes a Service Liability Enforcer

On November 3, 2026, the Supreme Court issued an order that would have made me smile — if it weren't so grim in its necessity.

The Court stopped the salary of Mumbai's Municipal Commissioner for wilful disobedience of time-bound directions to remove encroachments from land earmarked for a BEST bus stand. It imposed Rs 5 lakh costs and warned that jail time would follow unless orders were obeyed. Chief Justice Surya Kant's rebuke was sharp: "They will understand the language of this order because they don't understand decent language. We will send him to jail and then he will understand the language of the Supreme Court order."

This is not a new principle. It is, however, a rare and powerful example of what I have been calling for, in various forms, since June 2019: Service Liability — the notion that public servants who negligently or wilfully fail in their constitutional duties to citizens must face personal, financial, and legal consequences.

What the Service Liability Act Proposes

In my 2019 blog Needed: a Service Liability Act, I argued that India lacks a formal legal framework to hold government employees accountable for "crimes of omission" — deliberate inaction or negligence that harms citizens. Blog - "Needed: a Service Liability Act" - June 12, 2019

I proposed a Service Liability Act that would:

1. Define categories of harm: from minor injuries to deaths.
2. Establish coverage scope: individual citizen, community, or national impact.
3. Prescribe liability and punishment: damages payable by the errant officer, and imprisonment for wilful omissions.
4. Create a rating system (SLAM) — Service Liability Assessment Matrix — where citizens could rate government failures based on parameters like extent of harm, time frame, economic impact, and perceived cause (negligence, poor decision-making, or mala-fide intent).

The core principle was this: If a product manufacturer is held liable for defective goods that harm users, why should a government official be exempt from liability for services (or deliberate failures to render them) that harm citizens?

The Mumbai Commissioner Case: Service Liability in Practice

The Supreme Court's November 2026 order on the Mumbai Commissioner is a partial, grudging implementation of that principle — achieved through contempt of court rather than through a formal Service Liability Act. Let me break down how:

1. Identification of Duty and Failure

The Commissioner was tasked with removing encroachments from public land. The Supreme Court had issued time-bound directions on November 13, 2025, and again on July 28, 2026. The Commissioner failed to comply.

This maps directly to my framework: the extent of hurt (obstruction of public infrastructure, preventing a BEST bus stand from functioning), the time frame (explicit deadlines violated), and the cause (negligence or mala-fide collusion with encroachers).

The Court found: "a complete, deliberate, mischievous breach of the direction" and suggested "collusion and connivance with the encroachers." This is exactly the classification my Service Liability Act would require: deliberate omission with possible pecuniary benefit to the officer.

2. Salary Stoppage: The Teeth of Service Liability

The Supreme Court restrained the Maharashtra government from releasing the Commissioner's salary. This is a direct financial penalty for service failure — a principle I have advocated for years through algorithmic salary linkage.

In my 2015 email and subsequent blogs, I suggested that ward officers' salaries should be computed based on the percentage of time their assigned footpaths remain free of encroachments. The formula was:

Salary Payable = (Length of cleared footpath × Percentage time free) ÷ (Total footpath length × Total hours in month)

The Supreme Court, not having that framework, took the blunter approach: no salary until the job is done. It works, but it's crude compared to an algorithmic, transparent system.

3. Personal Accountability

The order specifically held the Municipal Commissioner personally accountable, not just "the corporation" or "the department." The Chief Justice asked the Commissioner to "show cause as to why appropriate action will not be taken against him."

This is the core of Service Liability: making the individual officer answerable, not hiding behind bureaucratic anonymity.

4. The Threat of Jail

The Supreme Court's warning — "We will send him to jail" — carries the force of criminal liability. My proposed Service Liability Act included imprisonment for willful omissions causing harm. The Supreme Court, constrained by existing contempt law, invoked the threat of jail as its strongest tool.

Why This Case Falls Short of a True Service Liability Regime

The Supreme Court's order is powerful, but it is also reactive, ad-hoc, and limited in scope. A formal Service Liability Act would address several gaps:

1. No Systemic Reach

The Mumbai case addresses one Commissioner, one project, one Supreme Court petition. A Service Liability Act would create standing authority for all citizens to rate and file complaints against service failures across all government departments — not just those that reach the apex court.

2. No Clear Graduated Penalties

The Supreme Court had two options: salary stoppage or jail. A Service Liability Act would prescribe graduated penalties based on the severity of the failure (using my SLAM framework), ensuring proportional accountability.

3. No Digital Transparency

I proposed that citizens should be able to rate service failures in real time using a mobile app — the Service Liability Assessment Matrix (SLAM). The Mumbai case required a full Supreme Court hearing. A Service Liability Act would democratize the accountability process.

4. Judges Become Administrators

The Supreme Court is being forced to micro-manage municipal encroachment removal because no statutory framework exists to hold the Commissioner accountable. This is an abdication of the legislative function. As I noted in my 2023 email to the Law Minister: "Our constitution allows you to only 'Interpret' existing laws. It does NOT allow you to 'Enact' a new law." Email - "Dear Law Minister: Here is a Law-Suggestion for Your Consideration" - November 23, 2023

Yet the Court had no choice but to assert quasi-legislative muscle, precisely because no Service Liability Act exists.

The Encroachment Problem: A Case Study in Service Liability

The Mumbai encroachment saga goes back decades. In 2015, when I first addressed this issue, the BMC was issuing 3-month action plans to clear footpaths — and years later, nothing had changed.

I proposed that ward officers' salaries be linked algorithmically to cleared footpath length and duration. Email - "2 DOWN: 1 TO GO!" - December 12, 2015 The idea was simple: if the service (clear footpaths) is not delivered, the officer's compensation shrinks proportionally.

The Supreme Court, in its 2026 order, reached the same conclusion but through judicial brute force: no salary at all until encroachments are removed. If a Service Liability Act had been in place since 2019, the Commissioner's salary would have been algorithmically reduced with each day of non-compliance, making the pain cumulative and immediate rather than waiting for a Supreme Court order.

The Larger Pattern: Courts Filling the Void

This is not an isolated case. The Supreme Court has repeatedly inserted itself into the role of enforcement because statutory service liability does not exist. In my 2021 blog Next Day – After Next – After Next?, I cited the Bombay High Court's threat to hold the principal secretary of Maharashtra's Public Health Department personally responsible for malnutrition deaths in the Melghat region. Blog - "Next Day – After Next – After Next?" - August 26, 2021

The Court could only threaten accountability because no law gave it a mechanism for enforcement.

What Should Happen Now

The Mumbai Commissioner case validates three points I have made:

1. Service Liability is needed: The Supreme Court's action proves that personal accountability for public servants is both necessary and possible.

2. Judicial enforcement is crude: Stopping a salary entirely is effective but blunt. A graduated, algorithmic system — where penalties scale with duration and severity of non-compliance — would be fairer and more transparent.

3. Statutory clarity prevents abuse: The lack of a Service Liability Act meant that the Supreme Court had to assert contempt powers and jail threats, creating uncertainty. A formal Act would define duties, timelines, penalties, and remedies with clarity.

A Modest Proposal for the Government

The government should:

1. Enact a Service Liability Act based on principles I outlined in 2019 and refined in my 2025 letter to the PM (Need for a God Father). Blog - "Need for a God Father" - July 29, 2025

2. Create a digital Service Liability Assessment Matrix (SLAM) where citizens can rate service failures, generating transparency and a searchable record of officer accountability.

3. Link officer compensation to service delivery metrics, using algorithmic salary computation rather than binary salary stoppage.

4. Empower district magistrates and state commissioners to act as service liability adjudicators, reducing the burden on courts.

5. Establish a time-bound grievance redressal system with automatic escalation if service delivery targets are missed.

Conclusion: When Judges Are Forced to Become Service Liability Enforcers

The Supreme Court's November 2026 order stopping the Mumbai Commissioner's salary is not judicial overreach — it is a consequence of legislative failure. Had a Service Liability Act been enacted five years ago (when I first proposed it), the Commissioner's non-compliance would have triggered automatic penalties, transparent public rating, and predictable remedies.

Instead, the Court was forced to issue contempt notices and jail warnings because no statute existed to hold the officer accountable.

This case validates my conviction that India urgently needs a Service Liability Act. And it shows that when the judiciary steps in to fill that void, it does so with justice and force — but at great cost to efficiency, fairness, and the separation of powers.

The Mumbai encroachments will now likely be cleared. But thousands of other failures — in water quality, pollution control, safety inspection, child malnutrition, occupational hazards — will persist, waiting for a Supreme Court to intervene. That is not a sustainable model for governance.

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Sources

#	Title	Date	About
1	Needed: a Service Liability Act	2019-06-12	Framework for holding government servants accountable for crimes of omission causing citizen harm.
2	2 DOWN: 1 TO GO!	2015-12-12	Proposal for algorithm-based salary computation linked to encroachment removal performance.
3	Next Day – After Next – After Next?	2021-08-26	Bombay High Court threat to hold officials personally liable for preventable deaths.
4	Dear Law Minister: Here is a Law-Suggestion for Your Consideration	2023-11-23	Formal Service Liability Bill framework sent to Law Ministry.
5	Need for a God Father	2025-07-29	Updated appeal to PM for enacting Service Liability Act with SLAM mechanism.
6	Supreme Court Stops Salary Of Mumbai Corporation Commissioner Over Failure To Remove Encroachments; Imposes Rs 5 Lakh Cost	2026-11-03	Supreme Court order holding Municipal Commissioner personally liable for non-compliance with encroachment removal directions.