===================================================
Dear Shri Raghav Chadhaji
[ raghav.chadha@sansad.nic.in / raghavchadha.mprs@sansad.nic.in
]
I just came across
this news report where you have proposed some method whereby voters can recall
a MP / MLA , if they are not satisfied with his performance :
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/aaps-raghav-chadha-pushes-for-right-to-recall-of-elected-mlas-mps-10986579
Many thanks for raising this very important aspect of the ACCOUNTABILITY
of MP/MLA towards his constituent voters
I have, myself , suggested this to our Cabinet Ministers through my
following emails :
> ROMP - A
Panacea ? …………………………… 06 Aug 2015
Dear Shri Chadhaji,
Whereas your suggestion
is very timely, I urge you to take it to its logical end-point by introducing a
suitable BILL in the Rajya Sabha
For your evaluation,
I attach below, such a BILL drafted by GROK , using my 2015 email
FRAME WORK as its basis
I will greatly appreciate your acknowledgement / comments
With Regards,
Hemen Parekh
www.HemenParekh.ai / www.IndiaAGI.ai / www.My-Teacher.in / 12 Feb 2026
PS :
I think our Ministers and Politicians , would greatly benefit if the websites of Lok Sabha and of the State Legislatures, were to have a provision where " Duty Conscious Citizen " can upload DRAFT BILLS ( like the one below ) . Other citizen may be able to post their COMMENTS / MODIFICATIONS
Instead of citizen just complaining, this provision would encourage them to come forward with CONSTRUCTIVE action plans pertaining to Societal problems
================================================
Recall of MP / MLA Act - 2026
A Bill to provide for the recall of Members
of Parliament (MPs) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) by their
constituents on grounds of dissatisfaction with performance, without requiring
any criminal proceedings, and for matters connected therewith.
Be
it enacted by Parliament in the Seventy-seventh Year of the Republic of India
as follows:
1. Short Title, Extent, and Commencement
(1) This Act may be called
the Recall of MP / MLA Act, 2026. (2) It extends to the whole of India. (3) It
shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.
2. Definitions
In this Act, unless the
context otherwise requires: (a) "Constituent Voter" means a person
who is registered on the electoral roll of the constituency and who cast a vote
(including NOTA) in the election from which the MP or MLA was elected. (b)
"Presiding Officer" means:
- The
Speaker of the Lok Sabha for Lok Sabha MPs;
- The
Chairman of the Rajya Sabha for Rajya Sabha MPs;
- The
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly for MLAs;
- Or
any person acting in that capacity. (c) "Recall" means the
removal of an MP or MLA from office, leading to a by-election. (d)
"Signature Campaign" means an online process for collecting
electronic signatures from Constituent Voters in support of recalling an
MP or MLA.
3. Grounds for Recall
(1) An MP or MLA may be
recalled by Constituent Voters if they are dissatisfied with the member's
performance, conduct, or effectiveness in representing the constituency. (2) No
criminal offense, FIR, charge sheet, arrest, bail, trial, or punishment is required
or involved in the recall process.
4. Initiation of Recall Process
(1) Any Constituent Voter
may file a petition with the Presiding Officer seeking permission to initiate a
Signature Campaign for the recall of the MP or MLA elected from their constituency.
(2) The petition shall include:
- The
petitioner's details and proof of being a Constituent Voter;
- Reasons
for dissatisfaction (e.g., lack of honesty, integrity, sincerity, hard
work, punctuality, dignity, adherence to rules, approachability, responsiveness
to voters, or respectful conduct, as inspired by public frameworks for
evaluation).
- Supporting
affidavits from at least 100 other Constituent Voters. (3) The Presiding
Officer shall verify the petition within 30 days and may grant permission
if satisfied that it is genuine and not frivolous.
5. Suspension During Campaign
Upon granting permission
for the Signature Campaign, the concerned MP or MLA shall be suspended from
attending sessions of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly until the campaign
concludes and results are declared. During suspension, the member shall retain
salary and allowances but lose voting and participation rights.
6. Conduct of Online Signature Campaign
(1) The Signature Campaign
shall be hosted on the official website of the concerned Legislature (e.g.,
Parliament of India or State Legislative Assembly website), authorized and
launched by the Presiding Officer. (2) The campaign shall run for a fixed
duration of 60 days from the date of launch. (3) Only Constituent Voters may
participate, verified through Aadhaar-linked biometric identification or other
secure electronic means integrated with the Election Commission's database. (4)
Participants shall provide a simple affirmation of support for recall (e.g.,
"I support the recall of [MP/MLA Name]"). No detailed ratings are
required, but the system may optionally allow brief justifications. (5) To
prevent undue influence, the ongoing results (e.g., number of signatures
collected) shall not be visible or accessible to the public, voters, or the
concerned MP/MLA during the campaign period. (6) The Election Commission shall
oversee the technical integrity of the campaign platform.
7. Threshold for Recall
(1) For the recall to be
valid, at least 66% of the total Constituent Voters (who voted in the relevant
election) must participate in the Signature Campaign. (2) Recall shall be
effected if more than 66% of the participating voters affirm support for
recall. (3) If participation meets the threshold but support is divided (e.g.,
some for lesser measures like suspension), the Presiding Officer may opt for
extended suspension instead of full recall, based on the majority sentiment.
8. Declaration of Results
(1) At the end of the
campaign duration, the Presiding Officer shall verify and declare the results
publicly on the Legislature's website and through notification in the Official
Gazette and leading newspapers within 7 days. (2) If the recall is successful,
the seat shall be declared vacant, and a by-election shall be conducted by the
Election Commission within 60 days.
9. Safeguards and Penalties
(1) Frivolous petitions or
misuse of the process (e.g., false signatures) shall attract penalties under
the Indian Penal Code for forgery or misrepresentation. (2) The concerned MP or
MLA may challenge the process in the High Court on grounds of procedural
irregularity. (3) No recall campaign may be initiated within the first two
years of the member's term or within six months of the end of the term.
10. Power to Make Rules
The Central Government
may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act,
including technical standards for the online platform and verification
processes.
Statement of Objects and Reasons
This Act aims to enhance
accountability of elected representatives by empowering voters to recall
underperforming MPs or MLAs through a transparent, online mechanism, drawing
from public proposals like the 2015 "ROMP" framework, without
involving criminal justice elements. It promotes democratic participation while
safeguarding against abuse.
ANNEXURE :
Comparison of the Proposed "Recall of
MP / MLA Act - 2026" to Global Recall Laws
The proposed Indian draft
introduces a recall mechanism for individual Members of Parliament (MPs) and
Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) based on voter dissatisfaction with
performance, without requiring criminal wrongdoing.
This is a form of
"political recall," which is relatively rare globally at the national
level for legislators.
Worldwide, recall provisions are more common for local
officials or executives (e.g., mayors, governors, presidents) than for national
parliamentarians.
They exist in at least 25 countries, primarily at subnational
levels, and are used sparingly due to high thresholds and procedural hurdles.
Key global examples include the US (state legislators), UK (national MPs, but
misconduct-based), Canada (provincial MLAs), Switzerland (cantonal
parliaments), Taiwan (national legislators), Bolivia (national elected
officials), Ecuador (national), and Peru (subnational). Recalls often stem from
direct democracy traditions, with Latin America seeing frequent use at local
levels.
The Indian draft shares
similarities with "bottom-up" or direct recall systems (e.g.,
petition-initiated) but includes unique features like :
> mandatory suspension during the campaign,
> hidden results, and
> an online-only platform on the egislature's website.
Globally, thresholds are generally lower (10-40%
signatures), processes are often physical (not online-exclusive), and
suspension is rare. Outcomes typically lead to by-elections or replacements,
with safeguards against abuse (e.g., time limits on initiation).
Below is a table comparing
core aspects across selected countries/regions where recall applies to
legislators. Examples focus on systems for parliamentarians or equivalents;
where national-level recall is absent, subnational analogs are used for
comparison.
|
Aspect
|
Indian
Draft (Proposed)
|
UK
(Recall of MPs Act 2015)
|
US
(State Legislators, e.g., in 19 States like California)
|
Canada
(British Columbia, Recall and Initiative Act 1995)
|
Switzerland
(6 Cantons, e.g., Bern)
|
Taiwan
(Constitutional Amendments)
|
Bolivia
(2009 Constitution)
|
|
Level
|
National (MPs) and state
(MLAs).
|
National (MPs in House
of Commons).
|
Primarily state
(legislators); no national.
|
Provincial (MLAs).
|
Cantonal (subnational
parliaments).
|
National (legislators).
|
National (all elected
officials, including legislators).
|
|
Targets
|
Individual MPs/MLAs.
|
Individual MPs.
|
Individual state
legislators.
|
Individual MLAs.
|
Whole parliament or
government (not individuals).
|
Individual legislators.
|
Individual elected
authorities.
|
|
Grounds Required
|
None; based on
dissatisfaction (e.g., performance, conduct).
|
Specific wrongdoing
(e.g., custodial sentence >1 year, serious misconduct like expenses
fraud). No general dissatisfaction.
|
Varies:
malfeasance/misconduct in 7 states; none (political) in others.
|
None (political
dissatisfaction allowed).
|
None specified (political).
|
None (political).
|
Programmatic
(performance against plans); no malfeasance required.
|
|
Initiation
|
Petition by constituent
voter + 100 affidavits; Speaker/Presiding Officer permission.
|
Indirect: Triggered by
official findings (e.g., court conviction or parliamentary committee). No
public initiation.
|
Direct: Public petition.
|
Direct: Public petition
(after 18 months in office).
|
Direct: Public petition.
|
Direct for lower
officials; indirect (legislative proposal) for higher.
|
Direct: Public request.
|
|
Signature/Participation Thresholds
|
66% of constituent
voters must participate; >66% of participants must support recall.
|
10% of electorate signs
petition to trigger by-election.
|
Varies: e.g., 12-25% of
votes from last election.
|
>40% of registered
voters in constituency.
|
Varies: 2-30% of
electorate (e.g., 30,000 signatures in Bern).
|
>50% valid ballots
with >50% turnout for high officials; varies for others.
|
15-30% signatures
(depending on office).
|
|
Process Details
|
60-day online signature
campaign on legislature website; results hidden during process to avoid
influence; verified via Aadhaar/biometrics.
|
6-week physical petition
period at designated spots; no online mandate; no hidden results.
|
90-180 day petition
collection (physical/digital hybrid in some); court review possible; recall
election if threshold met. No suspension or hidden results.
|
Petition collection;
validated by elections body; no suspension; results public.
|
Signature collection;
leads to vote; no online specifics or suspension.
|
Signature collection
(recently added ID verification, some online elements); no suspension
mentioned.
|
Mid-term only; signature
collection; vote if valid. No online or suspension.
|
|
Suspension During Process
|
Yes: MP/MLA suspended
from sessions (retains salary but no voting/participation).
|
No.
|
No (rare exceptions).
|
No.
|
No.
|
No.
|
No.
|
|
Outcomes
|
Seat vacated;
by-election within 60 days.
|
By-election if petition
succeeds; recalled MP can run again.
|
Removal + replacement
election (simultaneous in some states).
|
Seat vacated;
by-election.
|
New elections for whole
body.
|
Removal; by-election.
|
Removal; new elections.
|
|
Safeguards
|
No initiation in first 2
years or last 6 months; penalties for misuse; court challenge option.
|
Strict triggers limit
use; only 3 petitions held (2018-2019).
|
Time limits (e.g., not
in first/last year); grounds in some states.
|
No petition in first 18
months; one per term.
|
High thresholds; rarely
used.
|
After first year; one
per term; 2024 amendments for verification.
|
Mid-term only; one
process per term.
|
|
Examples of Usage
|
N/A (proposed).
|
3 petitions (e.g., 2018
North Antrim; none led to recall due to low signatures).
|
Numerous: e.g., 2011
Arizona (Russell Pearce recalled); 2013 Colorado (2 senators).
|
26 petitions launched;
none succeeded (e.g., 1998 Paul Reitsma resigned mid-process).
|
12 attempts; 4 votes;
all unsuccessful except historical (1862 Aargau, pre-abolition).
|
2025 "Great Recall
Wave" targeting 30+ legislators; 2020 Kaohsiung mayor success.
|
Sporadic; part of
broader activations (e.g., local levels).
|
|
Similarities to Draft
|
Direct initiation; no
grounds needed; leads to by-election.
|
Individual targeting;
petition-based.
|
Political recall option;
petition thresholds.
|
Political recall; high
threshold; by-election.
|
Petition-based.
|
Individual targeting;
some online verification.
|
No malfeasance required;
direct process.
|
|
Differences from Draft
|
No suspension; lower
thresholds; misconduct triggers only; no online/hidden results.
|
No suspension; grounds
required; physical process.
|
No mandatory
online/hidden results; lower thresholds; varies by state.
|
No suspension/online;
lower threshold (40%).
|
Targets whole body; no
suspension/online.
|
No hidden
results/suspension; indirect for some.
|
No online/suspension;
programmatic focus.
|
Overall, the Indian
draft's high thresholds (66%) make success unlikely, similar to global trends
where recalls rarely succeed (e.g., none in Colombia despite 54 votes; dormant
in Cuba).
Its online focus aligns with modern trends (e.g., Taiwan's 2024 ID verification),
but suspension and hidden results are distinctive, potentially to ensure
fairness but risking controversy over access and transparency.
Globally,
recalls are debated as tools for accountability versus instability; in Peru,
over 5,000 local activations (1997-2013) led to reforms requiring grounds after
2015 to curb abuse. If enacted, India's system could inspire similar digital
mechanisms elsewhere, but might face challenges in implementation given low
global usage at national levels.
