Why “Blocking” Needs a Certificate,

 

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Dear Shri Ashwini vaishnawji :

This is in continuation of my recent proposal for :

AIR ( AI Regulation ) Act - 2026 

With regards,

Hemen Parekh

www.Iam-Immortal.ai /  www.IndiaAGI.ai  /  www.YourContentCreator.in 

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Why “Blocking” Needs a Certificate, a Local Complaint Desk, and a

Compliance Officer

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Sweden’s Government Offices has reportedly blocked access to ChatGPT and

Claude on staff computers and directed employees to use Microsoft Copilot, citing

missing contracts and problematic use.

Whatever one thinks of the particular tool choice, the governance lesson is

broader: 

when governments rely on AI in official workflows, they cannot treat AI

access as a free-for-all. 

If contracts, accountability, and enforceable responsibilities are unclear, institutions

will revert to hard operational controls—like blocking.

That is exactly the weakness many AI debates miss: 

blocking is a blunt instrument unless it sits inside a predictable, rule-

based system. 

My AIR Act draft addresses this by treating “access to the market” as conditional

for foreign providers—because that is the only practical lever governments have

when full direct jurisdiction is limited.

My Part B (Foreign AI providers) builds enforcement capability before the

shutdown

In the draft Artificial Intelligence Regulation (AIR) Act, 2026, Part B is

explicitly designed so that foreign providers cannot offer services to users in India

unless they satisfy conditions that create real enforceability.

In particular, Part B requires:

• An India Access Certificate before offering a chatbot / foundation model /
•  high-risk AI system to users in India
• 
  Blog - “AIR Act - 2026” - 2026-10-25/27
• 
  
• Appointment of a Resident Grievance Officer (so complaints can be received
• and disposed of in India)
• 
  Blog - “AIR Act - 2026” - 2026-10-25/27
• 
  
• Appointment of a Resident Compliance Officer (a senior person responsible
•  for compliance and liable for non-compliance, subject to due diligence)
• 
  Blog - “AIR Act - 2026” - 2026-10-25/27
• 
  

This turns “accountability” from a slogan into an operational reality: there is a local

human desk for grievances, and a local compliance owner who can be held

responsible.

Blocking should be the last step—not the first response

Part B also specifies graded enforcement: 

#   warnings and advisories first; penalties and facilitation-stoppage next; 

#   then suspension/cancellation; 

#   and only at the end a recommendation for blocking under the IT Act

      framework.

Blog - “AIR Act - 2026” - 2026-10-25/27

So, yes—blocking can happen. But in a Part B world, blocking is not a surprise “hit

the switch” moment. It is the final step after a structured ladder has been

exhausted.

Final takeaway

Sweden’s reported action shows that governments will protect themselves when

contracts and accountability gaps exist.

India shouldn’t just copy the response. India should copy the system design

principle: condition access in advance, provide local grievance and

compliance responsibility, enforce proportionately, and only then move

toward blocking.

That is what Part B is for.