Hi Friends,

Even as I launch this today ( my 80th Birthday ), I realize that there is yet so much to say and do. There is just no time to look back, no time to wonder,"Will anyone read these pages?"

With regards,
Hemen Parekh
27 June 2013

Now as I approach my 90th birthday ( 27 June 2023 ) , I invite you to visit my Digital Avatar ( www.hemenparekh.ai ) – and continue chatting with me , even when I am no more here physically

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Tuesday, 16 June 2026

Make the Farmer a Party to the Price

 






White Paper · Agricultural Price Policy

Make the Farmer
a Party to the Price

A participatory, projection-based alternative to a legislated MSP guarantee — where the government and the farmer settle the price by looking at the same arithmetic.

The demand to make the Minimum Support Price a legal guarantee, and the government's reluctance to concede it, have hardened into an impasse that neither side can win without the other losing.

This paper proposes a third path — one that requires no new statute and imposes no ceiling on anything. It asks the government to do something it has never done systematically: before every Rabi and Kharif season, publish the full rupee arithmetic of the Minimum Support Price (MSP) — for each grain, at each candidate price, across a realistic range of purchase quantities — together with an honest statement of how any additional burden would be paid for. Farmer unions would then stop petitioning from outside the budget and begin deliberating inside it, as a party to the trade-off rather than a claimant against it.

A guarantee compelled by law is a liability of unknown size. A price agreed through shared arithmetic is a decision everyone owns.

The impasse

A binary that cannot resolve

The present debate offers only two answers. Either MSP is written into law as an enforceable right — in which case the exchequer accepts an open-ended liability whose size it cannot forecast — or it is refused, in which case the farmer is left to suspect that "fiscal prudence" is merely a polite word for indifference.

Both answers share the same defect: they are argued in the dark. The farmer does not see what a higher MSP truly costs the nation. The citizen does not see what is given up to fund it. And the minister, holding numbers neither side trusts, defends a position rather than a calculation. Distrust is the predictable product of opacity, not of bad faith.

The principle

Fiscal truth, shared on a schedule

The instrument proposed here is disclosure, not limitation. To be explicit, because it is easily misread: this paper recommends no cap on MSP for any grain, and no cap on the quantity the government may purchase. It asks only that the consequences of every choice be made visible to all, and that the choice then be made together. Three commitments carry it:

One — Publish the projection every season

Ahead of each Rabi and Kharif season, the government places before the public a grid: for wheat, paddy and the other procured grains, the total purchase outlay at the current MSP and at each higher MSP under discussion, computed across a realistic band of likely purchase quantities.

Two — Name the source of the money, honestly

Every rupee of additional outlay is matched, in the same document, to how it would be raised: by additional taxation, by re-allocation from a named budget head, or by additional borrowing. No increase is presented as if it were free.

Three — Seat the farmer as a party to the choice

The Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Finance jointly convene farmer unions not to receive a demand and reject it, but to decide with them: "We can raise wheat MSP to this figure; here is what it costs; here is what must give way to pay for it. What shall it be?" The farmer thus helps author the trade-off, and shares responsibility for it.

The arithmetic

Why a single number will not do

The outlay on any grain is simply quantity purchased × MSP. The trap is to imagine that only the price moves. It does not. When the support price rises above the open-market price, more grain is diverted into government godowns — so the quantity the exchequer must buy rises alongside the price it pays. The burden therefore grows on two axes at once, and can climb faster than the price alone suggests.

This is precisely why the projection must be published as a grid of price against quantity, and why the quantity assumptions must be credible. It is not an argument against raising MSP. It is the strongest argument for letting everyone see the figure before it is fixed.

The record

What recent seasons actually cost

Rice and wheat together account for almost the entire MSP purchase operation. The table below shows the gross MSP outlay — the money paid directly to farmers — for the two most recently completed cycles, set against the central government's gross tax revenue for the same years.

Gross MSP outlay on paddy + wheat, against central gross tax revenue. Figures rounded; sources: PIB / FCI season statements and Union Budget documents.
SeasonPaddy outlay (₹ cr)Wheat outlay (₹ cr)Combined (₹ cr)Share of gross tax revenue
2022–23≈ 1,59,660≈ 37,880≈ 1,97,540≈ 6.5%
2023–24≈ 1,74,000≈ 55,675≈ 2,29,675≈ 6.6%

Wheat outlay derived as quantity procured × MSP (188 LMT × ₹2,015; 262 LMT × ₹2,125). Paddy figures are the MSP value officially reported as paid to farmers. The 2024–25 paddy figure is omitted because that season's procurement was still being finalised at the time of writing; wheat for 2024–25 was ≈ ₹60,515 cr (266 LMT × ₹2,275).

Two facts stand out. The claim on revenue is material — roughly one rupee in every fifteen the centre collects in tax — and it is uncapped: across these years both the price and the quantity rose together, with no rule mediating the increase. That is the vacuum this proposal fills, not with a rule, but with daylight.

A worked season · illustrative

Wheat, the way it ought to be shown

The following is an illustration of the document the government would publish, using the current wheat MSP of ₹2,425 per quintal and an assumed purchase of 300 LMT (30 crore quintals) as the baseline. The figures are arithmetic, not forecasts; their purpose is to show the form of the disclosure.

Participation Ballot · Wheat · illustrative season

What would a higher MSP cost, and who would pay?

If wheat MSP is set atAt purchase ofTotal outlayExtra vs baseline
₹2,425 (current)300 LMT₹72,750 cr
₹2,700300 LMT₹81,000 cr+₹8,250 cr
₹3,000300 LMT₹90,000 cr+₹17,250 cr
₹3,200300 LMT₹96,000 cr+₹23,250 cr
₹3,000 — but more grain arrives340 LMT₹1,02,000 cr+₹29,250 cr

The last row shows the two-axis effect: a higher price pulls more grain to the government, so the same ₹3,000 MSP can cost more than the price rise alone implies.

To fund the +₹23,250 cr case, the choice before us is one of these:

The ballot is not a threat. It is the truth a household already lives by: a larger sum for one purpose is a smaller sum for another, or a larger bill later. The farmer is asked to mark the box alongside everyone else.

The comparison

Why this is better than a law

On the question of…A legislated MSP guaranteeA participatory compact
Fiscal liabilityOpen-ended; unknown in advanceChosen each season, in full view
LegitimacyImposed; contested by those who payCo-authored; owned by all parties
The farmer's roleBeneficiary of a rightParty to a decision
FlexibilityRigid until amended by ParliamentRevisited every Rabi and Kharif
What it runs onStatutory compulsionShared information and trust
No new law required.
Only a standing commitment to publish the arithmetic and decide together.

Two guardrails

What keeps it honest

The funding menu must be complete, never a single threatened cut

If the government were to present only "raise MSP or fund the army," the exercise would collapse into blackmail and forfeit trust. The menu must always carry the full set of real options — taxation, re-allocation from any of several heads, and borrowing — so that the farmer chooses among genuine alternatives rather than under duress.

The quantity assumptions must come from a body everyone trusts

Because the burden turns on how much grain a given price will draw to the government, the quantity estimates decide the whole result. They should be produced and the model published by a credible, non-partisan authority — the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, or an independent fiscal council — so that no party can claim the grid was rigged. Transparency of method is as important as transparency of figures.

The Ask

This paper requests two specific commitments.

To the Hon'ble Minister of Agriculture & Farmers' Welfare

  1. Convene, jointly with the Finance Minister, a pre-season consultation with farmer unions ahead of each Rabi and Kharif, built around the published projection rather than around a demand.
  2. Direct that the MSP–quantity grid for every procured grain be released to the public at the same time it is placed before the unions.

To the Hon'ble Minister of Finance

  1. Attach to each seasonal projection an honest funding statement — taxes, re-allocation, or borrowing — for every increment of MSP under consideration.
  2. Mandate that the underlying quantity model be prepared by CACP or an independent fiscal authority and published in full, so that the figures command the confidence of all parties.

On the originating idea. The principle developed here — that the price the government pays and the quantity it buys must be reconciled openly against the public purse — was first set out by the author under the label MPQ (Maximum Purchase Quantity) at myblogepage.blogspot.com, and is offered here as prior art for the participatory mechanism proposed above.

Hemen Parekh · June 2026 · A white paper for public deliberation.

https://myblogepage.blogspot.com/2023/10/buying-crops-govt-must-apportion-its.html


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