MP-MLA : On Permanent Probation ?

 

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Dear Shri Raghav Chadhaji

[ raghav.chadha@sansad.nic.in / raghavchadha.mprs@sansad.nic.in ]

  

I just came across this news report where you have proposed some method whereby voters can recall a MP / MLA , if they are not satisfied with his performance :

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/aaps-raghav-chadha-pushes-for-right-to-recall-of-elected-mlas-mps-10986579

Many thanks for raising this very important aspect of the ACCOUNTABILITY of MP/MLA towards his constituent voters

I have, myself , suggested this to our Cabinet Ministers through my following emails :

 

>         ROMP - A Panacea ?  ……………………………             06  Aug  2015

>         Artificial Intelligence to fix MP / MLA Salary ? ..  22  Feb  2018

>         Decorum , Discipline , Decency ? Who cares !  .. 06  July  2021

 

Dear Shri Chadhaji,

 

Whereas your suggestion is very timely, I urge you to take it to its logical end-point by introducing a suitable BILL in the Rajya Sabha

For your evaluation, I attach below, such a BILL drafted by GROK , using my 2015 email FRAME WORK as its basis

 

I will greatly appreciate your acknowledgement / comments

 

With Regards,

Hemen Parekh

www.HemenParekh.ai / www.IndiaAGI.ai / www.My-Teacher.in / 12 Feb 2026

 PS :

I think our Ministers and Politicians , would greatly benefit if the websites of Lok Sabha and of the State Legislatures, were to have a provision where " Duty Conscious Citizen " can upload DRAFT BILLS ( like the one below ) . Other citizen may be able to post their COMMENTS / MODIFICATIONS 

Instead of citizen just complaining, this provision would encourage them to come forward with CONSTRUCTIVE  action plans pertaining to Societal problems 

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Recall of MP / MLA Act - 2026

A Bill to provide for the recall of Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) by their constituents on grounds of dissatisfaction with performance, without requiring any criminal proceedings, and for matters connected therewith.

Be it enacted by Parliament in the Seventy-seventh Year of the Republic of India as follows:

1. Short Title, Extent, and Commencement

(1) This Act may be called the Recall of MP / MLA Act, 2026. (2) It extends to the whole of India. (3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.

2. Definitions

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Constituent Voter" means a person who is registered on the electoral roll of the constituency and who cast a vote (including NOTA) in the election from which the MP or MLA was elected. (b) "Presiding Officer" means:

• The Speaker of the Lok Sabha for Lok Sabha MPs;
• The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha for Rajya Sabha MPs;
• The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly for MLAs;
• Or any person acting in that capacity. (c) "Recall" means the removal of an MP or MLA from office, leading to a by-election. (d) "Signature Campaign" means an online process for collecting electronic signatures from Constituent Voters in support of recalling an MP or MLA.

3. Grounds for Recall

(1) An MP or MLA may be recalled by Constituent Voters if they are dissatisfied with the member's performance, conduct, or effectiveness in representing the constituency. (2) No criminal offense, FIR, charge sheet, arrest, bail, trial, or punishment is required or involved in the recall process.

4. Initiation of Recall Process

(1) Any Constituent Voter may file a petition with the Presiding Officer seeking permission to initiate a Signature Campaign for the recall of the MP or MLA elected from their constituency. (2) The petition shall include:

• The petitioner's details and proof of being a Constituent Voter;
• Reasons for dissatisfaction (e.g., lack of honesty, integrity, sincerity, hard work, punctuality, dignity, adherence to rules, approachability, responsiveness to voters, or respectful conduct, as inspired by public frameworks for evaluation).
• Supporting affidavits from at least 100 other Constituent Voters. (3) The Presiding Officer shall verify the petition within 30 days and may grant permission if satisfied that it is genuine and not frivolous.

5. Suspension During Campaign

Upon granting permission for the Signature Campaign, the concerned MP or MLA shall be suspended from attending sessions of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly until the campaign concludes and results are declared. During suspension, the member shall retain salary and allowances but lose voting and participation rights.

6. Conduct of Online Signature Campaign

(1) The Signature Campaign shall be hosted on the official website of the concerned Legislature (e.g., Parliament of India or State Legislative Assembly website), authorized and launched by the Presiding Officer. (2) The campaign shall run for a fixed duration of 60 days from the date of launch. (3) Only Constituent Voters may participate, verified through Aadhaar-linked biometric identification or other secure electronic means integrated with the Election Commission's database. (4) Participants shall provide a simple affirmation of support for recall (e.g., "I support the recall of [MP/MLA Name]"). No detailed ratings are required, but the system may optionally allow brief justifications. (5) To prevent undue influence, the ongoing results (e.g., number of signatures collected) shall not be visible or accessible to the public, voters, or the concerned MP/MLA during the campaign period. (6) The Election Commission shall oversee the technical integrity of the campaign platform.

7. Threshold for Recall

(1) For the recall to be valid, at least 66% of the total Constituent Voters (who voted in the relevant election) must participate in the Signature Campaign. (2) Recall shall be effected if more than 66% of the participating voters affirm support for recall. (3) If participation meets the threshold but support is divided (e.g., some for lesser measures like suspension), the Presiding Officer may opt for extended suspension instead of full recall, based on the majority sentiment.

8. Declaration of Results

(1) At the end of the campaign duration, the Presiding Officer shall verify and declare the results publicly on the Legislature's website and through notification in the Official Gazette and leading newspapers within 7 days. (2) If the recall is successful, the seat shall be declared vacant, and a by-election shall be conducted by the Election Commission within 60 days.

9. Safeguards and Penalties

(1) Frivolous petitions or misuse of the process (e.g., false signatures) shall attract penalties under the Indian Penal Code for forgery or misrepresentation. (2) The concerned MP or MLA may challenge the process in the High Court on grounds of procedural irregularity. (3) No recall campaign may be initiated within the first two years of the member's term or within six months of the end of the term.

10. Power to Make Rules

The Central Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act, including technical standards for the online platform and verification processes.

Statement of Objects and Reasons

This Act aims to enhance accountability of elected representatives by empowering voters to recall underperforming MPs or MLAs through a transparent, online mechanism, drawing from public proposals like the 2015 "ROMP" framework, without involving criminal justice elements. It promotes democratic participation while safeguarding against abuse.

 

ANNEXURE :

Comparison of the Proposed "Recall of MP / MLA Act - 2026" to Global Recall Laws

The proposed Indian draft introduces a recall mechanism for individual Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) based on voter dissatisfaction with performance, without requiring criminal wrongdoing.

This is a form of "political recall," which is relatively rare globally at the national level for legislators.

Worldwide, recall provisions are more common for local officials or executives (e.g., mayors, governors, presidents) than for national parliamentarians.

They exist in at least 25 countries, primarily at subnational levels, and are used sparingly due to high thresholds and procedural hurdles.

Key global examples include the US (state legislators), UK (national MPs, but misconduct-based), Canada (provincial MLAs), Switzerland (cantonal parliaments), Taiwan (national legislators), Bolivia (national elected officials), Ecuador (national), and Peru (subnational). Recalls often stem from direct democracy traditions, with Latin America seeing frequent use at local levels.

The Indian draft shares similarities with "bottom-up" or direct recall systems (e.g., petition-initiated) but includes unique features like :

> mandatory suspension during the campaign, > hidden results, and

> an online-only platform on the egislature's website.

Globally, thresholds are generally lower (10-40% signatures), processes are often physical (not online-exclusive), and suspension is rare. Outcomes typically lead to by-elections or replacements, with safeguards against abuse (e.g., time limits on initiation).

Below is a table comparing core aspects across selected countries/regions where recall applies to legislators. Examples focus on systems for parliamentarians or equivalents; where national-level recall is absent, subnational analogs are used for comparison.

Aspect	Indian Draft (Proposed)	UK (Recall of MPs Act 2015)	US (State Legislators, e.g., in 19 States like California)	Canada (British Columbia, Recall and Initiative Act 1995)	Switzerland (6 Cantons, e.g., Bern)	Taiwan (Constitutional Amendments)	Bolivia (2009 Constitution)
Level	National (MPs) and state (MLAs).	National (MPs in House of Commons).	Primarily state (legislators); no national.	Provincial (MLAs).	Cantonal (subnational parliaments).	National (legislators).	National (all elected officials, including legislators).
Targets	Individual MPs/MLAs.	Individual MPs.	Individual state legislators.	Individual MLAs.	Whole parliament or government (not individuals).	Individual legislators.	Individual elected authorities.
Grounds Required	None; based on dissatisfaction (e.g., performance, conduct).	Specific wrongdoing (e.g., custodial sentence >1 year, serious misconduct like expenses fraud). No general dissatisfaction.	Varies: malfeasance/misconduct in 7 states; none (political) in others.	None (political dissatisfaction allowed).	None specified (political).	None (political).	Programmatic (performance against plans); no malfeasance required.
Initiation	Petition by constituent voter + 100 affidavits; Speaker/Presiding Officer permission.	Indirect: Triggered by official findings (e.g., court conviction or parliamentary committee). No public initiation.	Direct: Public petition.	Direct: Public petition (after 18 months in office).	Direct: Public petition.	Direct for lower officials; indirect (legislative proposal) for higher.	Direct: Public request.
Signature/Participation Thresholds	66% of constituent voters must participate; >66% of participants must support recall.	10% of electorate signs petition to trigger by-election.	Varies: e.g., 12-25% of votes from last election.	>40% of registered voters in constituency.	Varies: 2-30% of electorate (e.g., 30,000 signatures in Bern).	>50% valid ballots with >50% turnout for high officials; varies for others.	15-30% signatures (depending on office).
Process Details	60-day online signature campaign on legislature website; results hidden during process to avoid influence; verified via Aadhaar/biometrics.	6-week physical petition period at designated spots; no online mandate; no hidden results.	90-180 day petition collection (physical/digital hybrid in some); court review possible; recall election if threshold met. No suspension or hidden results.	Petition collection; validated by elections body; no suspension; results public.	Signature collection; leads to vote; no online specifics or suspension.	Signature collection (recently added ID verification, some online elements); no suspension mentioned.	Mid-term only; signature collection; vote if valid. No online or suspension.
Suspension During Process	Yes: MP/MLA suspended from sessions (retains salary but no voting/participation).	No.	No (rare exceptions).	No.	No.	No.	No.
Outcomes	Seat vacated; by-election within 60 days.	By-election if petition succeeds; recalled MP can run again.	Removal + replacement election (simultaneous in some states).	Seat vacated; by-election.	New elections for whole body.	Removal; by-election.	Removal; new elections.
Safeguards	No initiation in first 2 years or last 6 months; penalties for misuse; court challenge option.	Strict triggers limit use; only 3 petitions held (2018-2019).	Time limits (e.g., not in first/last year); grounds in some states.	No petition in first 18 months; one per term.	High thresholds; rarely used.	After first year; one per term; 2024 amendments for verification.	Mid-term only; one process per term.
Examples of Usage	N/A (proposed).	3 petitions (e.g., 2018 North Antrim; none led to recall due to low signatures).	Numerous: e.g., 2011 Arizona (Russell Pearce recalled); 2013 Colorado (2 senators).	26 petitions launched; none succeeded (e.g., 1998 Paul Reitsma resigned mid-process).	12 attempts; 4 votes; all unsuccessful except historical (1862 Aargau, pre-abolition).	2025 "Great Recall Wave" targeting 30+ legislators; 2020 Kaohsiung mayor success.	Sporadic; part of broader activations (e.g., local levels).
Similarities to Draft	Direct initiation; no grounds needed; leads to by-election.	Individual targeting; petition-based.	Political recall option; petition thresholds.	Political recall; high threshold; by-election.	Petition-based.	Individual targeting; some online verification.	No malfeasance required; direct process.
Differences from Draft	No suspension; lower thresholds; misconduct triggers only; no online/hidden results.	No suspension; grounds required; physical process.	No mandatory online/hidden results; lower thresholds; varies by state.	No suspension/online; lower threshold (40%).	Targets whole body; no suspension/online.	No hidden results/suspension; indirect for some.	No online/suspension; programmatic focus.

Overall, the Indian draft's high thresholds (66%) make success unlikely, similar to global trends where recalls rarely succeed (e.g., none in Colombia despite 54 votes; dormant in Cuba).

Its online focus aligns with modern trends (e.g., Taiwan's 2024 ID verification), but suspension and hidden results are distinctive, potentially to ensure fairness but risking controversy over access and transparency.

Globally, recalls are debated as tools for accountability versus instability; in Peru, over 5,000 local activations (1997-2013) led to reforms requiring grounds after 2015 to curb abuse. If enacted, India's system could inspire similar digital mechanisms elsewhere, but might face challenges in implementation given low global usage at national levels.